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The Short-Changing of Investors
WHY A SHORT SALE PRICE TEST RULE IS
NECESSARY IN TODAY’S MARKETS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The credit crisis that began in the United States in 2007
gripped the world financial system by September 2008,
eventually leading to a global recession into 2009, and
increased scrutiny of the governmental regulation of financial
markets.1 In the United States, a particular focus was placed
on the short selling of equity securities, especially the stocks of
financial sector companies most affected by the credit crisis.2
1

In September 2008, the Inspector General of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) released a report blasting the agency for its lax oversight of Bear
Stearns leading up to the collapse and subsequent sale of the investment bank to
JPMorgan Chase in March 2008. Kara Scannell, The Financial Crisis: SEC Faulted for
Missing Red Flags at Bear Stearns—Inspector General’s Scathing Report Says Agency
Failed to Require the Investment Bank to Rein in Its Risk-Taking, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
2008. The SEC issued an emergency ban on the short sale of hundreds of financial
stocks and revised its orders three days later, prompting harsh criticism from
numerous observers. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, The Financial Crisis: SEC Quickly
Revises Short-Selling Rules—Shift on Financials, Hedge Funds Sends Traders
Scrambling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at A9 (“There are a lot of us out there who are
wondering what the SEC is thinking, whether they’ve gone off the rails here.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charles Jones, Columbia Business School Finance
Professor)).
2
See Kara Scannell, The Financial Crisis: SEC Issues Short Selling Rules in
Bid to Stop Manipulation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18. 2008, at A6. The credit crisis began in
the late 1990’s as a result of a global increase in the availability in credit, spurred by
investment in real estate. David Leonhardt, Can’t Grasp Credit Crisis? Join the Club,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at A1. The United States housing market caught fire and
many of these mortgages, and later other types of debt, were packaged into investment
securities called collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) and sold to investors globally.
Id. Some of these CDOs consisted of subprime mortgages that had higher interest rates
because the loans were made to less creditworthy individuals. Id. Many investors,
including banks and investment firms, who purchased these securities used high levels
of leverage to invest in these CDOs. Id. When the U.S. housing market started to
decline in early 2007, some of the subprime borrowers began to default on mortgage
payments, which in turn meant that the CDOs purchased by investors also turned into
bad investments because investors stopped receiving payments on the mortgages
associated with CDOs. Id. The decrease in the value of the assets forced investors to
write down the value of these assets, further increasing the investor’s leverage. As the
financial system began to de-leverage, banks and other lenders were less willing to
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Short selling is the “sale of a security which the seller does not
own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a
security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.”3 A short
seller will then return the borrowed shares “by purchasing
equivalent securities on the open market.”4 A short seller
expects to profit by purchasing the replacement shares at a
price lower than the price at which he sold the borrowed
shares.5 The financial news media speculated as to whether
short sellers participated in market manipulation that drove
down stock prices and possibly accelerated the demise of
several large and established financial corporations including
American International Group and Lehman Brothers.6
Following these accusations of manipulation, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the New
York State Attorney General announced in September 2008
that they would begin an inquiry into possible “short selling
abuses.”7 At the height of the financial crisis, and in reaction to
cascading stock prices as well as continued public scrutiny and
speculation concerning market manipulation by short sellers,
the SEC took unprecedented action and issued an emergency
temporary ban on any short sales of the securities of 799
financial companies.8
extend credit to borrowers; investors providing capital began pulling money out
because of a fear of being exposed to risky investments like CDOs. Id. The hesitance of
banks and other lenders to extend credit to borrowers, even worthy ones, began to
affect other areas of the economy. Id. The credit crisis and subsequent economic fallout
are much more complicated than portrayed here. This simple summary is merely
meant to illustrate why the stocks of financial institutions were particularly
susceptible to short selling – the outlook for financial stocks in September 2008 was
grim.
3
17 C.F.R § 242.200(a) (2007).
4
Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 59,748, 74
Fed. Reg. 18,042, 18,044 (April 20, 2009) [hereinafter April 2009 Amendments to
Regulation SHO].
5
See id.
6
See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & Jonathan D. Glater, A Bid to Curb Profit Gambit as
Banks Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1; Posting of Evan Newmark to Deal
Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/19/mean-street-a-wall-street-conspiracy-ofcourse/ (Sept. 19, 2008, 10:35 EST).
7
Bajaj & Glater, supra note 6. New York State Attorney General Andrew
Cuomo compared short sellers to “looters after a hurricane.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
8
Press Release 2008-211, SEC, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks
to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/
2008-211.htm. The SEC put this ban into place for ten trading days to “prevent short
selling from being used to drive down the share prices of issuers even where there is no
fundamental basis for a price decline other than general market conditions.”
Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169, 55,170 (proposed Sept. 18,
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This extreme action banning short sales of certain
securities was notable because it was a striking divergence
from the actions the SEC took just a year earlier, when, in July
2007, it repealed the long-standing Rule 10a-1 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 Enacted in 1938 and
commonly known as the “uptick rule,”10 Rule 10a-1 was
intended “to restrict short selling in a declining market.”11 The
rule prohibited short selling a stock at a price less than the
price of the “immediately preceding” sale of that stock.12 The
SEC rescinded Rule 10a-1 in 2007 to “modernize and simplify
short sale regulation,” judging the rule “no longer . . . effective
or necessary.”13 The SEC’s repeal of the uptick rule was,
therefore, a complete repudiation of its longstanding judgment
that unrestricted short selling could be dangerous in a falling
stock market.
The stated mission of the modern-day SEC is to “protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and

2008) [hereinafter Sept. 2008 Emergency Order]. The SEC’s ban on short sales of
financial stocks followed a similar ban issued in the United Kingdom by the Financial
Services Authority and supported by that nation’s Treasury Chief. Kara Scannell et al.,
SEC Is Set to Issue Temporary Ban Against Short Selling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008,
at A1. The short selling ban was eventually extended to the stocks of almost 1000
companies. Kara Scannell & Serena Ng, SEC’s Ban on Short Selling Is Casting a Very
Wide Net, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at C1. Because the standards for inclusion on
the ban list were so broad, it included surprising names, such as CVS Caremark, the
pharmacy company and IBM, the technology company. Id. The short sell ban ended up
spanning a total of fourteen (14) trading days, from September 19 through October 8,
2008. Kara Scannell & Craig Karmin, Crisis on Wall Street: Short-Sale Ban Ends to
Poor Reviews, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at C3.
9
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No.
55,970, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348, 36,348 (July 3, 2007) [hereinafter Regulation SHO and
Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release]. In addition to eliminating Rule 10a-1, the Commission
also prohibited any self-regulatory organization (SRO) from promulgating its own price
test. Id. An SRO is a non-government entity that may implement regulations to protect
investors, such as a stock exchange. Investopedia, Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sro.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). Because the
SEC repealed Rule 10a-1, it also repealed Rule 200(g), which required marking
securities sales transactions exempted from Rule 10a-1 as “short exempt.” Regulation
SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, at 36,348.
10
Scannell et al., SEC Is Set to Issue Temporary Ban Against Short Selling,
supra note 8.
11
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at
36,348.
12
Id.
13
Id. Despite the fact the SEC loosened some restrictions on short selling by
repealing the uptick rule, Regulation SHO tightened restrictions on naked short
selling. Id.
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facilitate capital formation.”14 The Commission was formed in
193415 after the devastating effects of the stock market crash of
1929, and almost immediately, it examined the role of short
selling in securities markets and recommended regulation of
the practice.16 In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008,
the SEC again reconsidered its regulation of short selling and
whether the uptick rule or some other short sale price test is
necessary to protect investors and preserve orderly financial
markets.17 In April 2009, the SEC solicited public comments to
reconsider whether the uptick rule was necessary and if such a
rule “would help promote market stability and restore investor
confidence.”18 The SEC also sought comment on whether a
modified version of the uptick rule would be more appropriate.19
The SEC announced an additional public comment period to
address “alternative approaches” to the uptick rule in August
2009.20 Finally in February 2010, the SEC implemented Rule
201, a modified version of the original uptick rule.21 This
version of the rule, which became effective in May 2010, will
only be triggered “if the price of an individual security declines
intra-day by [ten percent] or more from the prior day’s closing
price for that security.”22 Once this ten percent decline occurs,
14

SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwe
do.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
15
The SEC was established as a result of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). The Securities and Exchange Act is codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78.
16
SEC, FIRST ANN. REP. OF THE SEC 16 (1935), http://www.sec.gov/about/
annual_report/1935.pdf. [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC] (“A detailed
analysis of the subject of short selling was made for the purpose of determining the
extent to which such selling is economically justified and the extent to which it should
be curbed.”). At this time, the Commission also recommended to the exchanges that it
should implement a version of the uptick rule, believing such a rule would “preserve
those features of short selling which are in the public interest.” Id. (emphasis added).
17
When SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro was nominated by President
Barack Obama in January 2009, she cited re-examination of the uptick rule by the SEC
as part of her agenda during her confirmation hearing with the Senate Banking
Committee. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Offers Plan for Tighter Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B3.
18
Press Release 2009-76, SEC, SEC Seeks Comments on Short Sale Price
Test and Circuit Breaker Restrictions (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2009/2009-76.htm.
19
Id.
20
Press Release 2009-185, SEC, SEC Seeks Comment on Alternative Uptick
Rule (Aug. 17, 2009), http://sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-185.htm.
21
Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75
Fed. Reg. 11,232, 11,233-34 (March 10, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Amendments to
Regulation SHO].
22
Id. at 11,234.
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short sellers may not sell a security “at or below the current
national best bid” for the “remainder of the day and the
following day.”23
The adoption of this alternative, compromise rule
reflects both the SEC’s acknowledgment of the need for some
regulation of short selling, and the tentativeness with which
the Commission has proceeded in this area, having changed its
position three times in just three years. Without attempting to
assess the pros and cons of the new rule, this Note argues more
generally that regulation of short selling—a feature of our
regulatory regime for over seventy years—is necessary to
ensure orderly markets and investor confidence. While the
adoption of Rule 201 is undoubtedly a positive step, a look at
the convoluted history of the rise and fall of the uptick rule
reveals a deeper concern over existing justifications for the rule
and what degree of short selling regulation is sufficient and
appropriate.
This Note will discuss the practice and history of short
selling and the uptick rule, including the reasons why the SEC
repealed the rule in 2007, whether its removal was in line with
the SEC’s mission, and why the rule is necessary to maintain
orderly markets. Part II describes the mechanics of short
selling equity stocks, the reasons for short selling and why
some have a negative view of the practice, and surveys the
history surrounding the implementation of the uptick rule in
1938. Part III examines the reasons why the SEC felt the
uptick rule was no longer necessary for effective market
regulation and the environment in which the SEC made this
decision. Part IV discusses alternative statutory provisions the
SEC could use to regulate short selling in the absence of the
uptick rule. Finally, Part V argues why the reinstatement of
the uptick rule or other price test on short selling as a backstop
method of protecting investors is necessary because of the
difficulty of proving fraudulent or collusive price manipulation
through short selling. It also examines the different versions of
price tests evaluated by SEC and the new alternative uptick
rule that took effect in May 2010. Finally, this Part posits that
the uptick rule can be used as a tool to preserve investor
confidence and maintain order in troubled, declining markets,
preventing both panic and any repeat of the type of radical
23

Id. The best bid is “[t]he highest quoted bid for a particular stock among all
those offered.” Investopedia, Best Bid, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/
bestbid.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
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measures taken by the SEC in September 2008, when it
banned all short sales of financial stocks.
II.

THE MECHANICS AND HISTORY OF SHORT SELLING AND
THE UPTICK RULE

Concerns and skepticism about the effects of short
selling of securities have led to regulation of the practice
around the world for hundreds of years.24 In 1922, J. Edward
Meeker, an economist for the New York Stock Exchange,
observed that although “prejudice against short selling of
securities is not new,” the practice of short selling has “stood
that hardest of all tests—the test of time.”25
A.

The “Mysterious”26 Practice of Short Selling: How It
Works

A short sale is, in simplest terms, a bet that the price of
a particular stock will fall.27 Investors initiate a short sale by
borrowing an amount of stock and selling it in anticipation that
they will be able to repurchase the same stock later, but at a
lower price.28 The borrower/investor (or his broker) later
repurchases the stock at the lower price, returns it to the
lender, and profits from the difference between the sale and
repurchase price.29 The borrower also pays the lender a fee for
24

J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 96-97 (1922),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=KDBIAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&
dq=The+work+of+the+stock+exchange. The practice of short selling was prohibited in
England in 1733, only to be reinstated in 1858. Id. France, the state of New York, and
Germany have also passed and later repealed legislation forbidding the practice. Id.
After Germany instituted a rule banning short sales on the Berlin Stock Exchange in
1896, at least one economist blamed the rule for an outflow of capital to other
international markets leading to depressed markets in Berlin. Id. at 97.
25
Id. at 96.
26
Id. at 97. Because short selling is a somewhat sophisticated investment
strategy that is not well known to the general public, short selling has also been
described as an activity “cloaked in secrecy.” Gary Weiss, The Long and Short of ShortSelling, BUS. WK., June 10, 1991, at 106.
27
Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the
Uptick Rule and Its Role in the View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1989). While different types of assets can be sold short,
this Note will focus on the short sale of equity securities.
28
Id. at 799; see also David Chung, Making Sense Out of Market Sentiment
Indicators, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 16, 1999, at A3; Weiss, supra note 26.
29
Macey et al., supra note 27, at 799-800. In the wake of the financial crisis
of 2008, there also was much discussion by business and media commentators about
the impact on financial markets of so-called naked short sales. A naked short sale
operates similarly to the short sale described here; the major difference is that in a
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the use of the stock in the transaction. Although there is no
central, public marketplace for borrowing shares for short
selling, short selling of stocks with a large market
capitalization is not difficult, since these stocks are widely held
and have high levels of institutional ownership.30 It is not as
simple or inexpensive to borrow stocks that have a smaller
market capitalization, are closely held, or are believed to be
overvalued, since these stocks are highly sought for
borrowing.31
One important distinction between a short sale and a
regular purchase of stock—when an investor purchases a stock
in anticipation that its value will rise—is the “theoretically
unlimited” risk of loss when an investor sells short.32 If an
investor made a run-of-the-mill stock purchase to hold it for the
long term (a “long” position), and the stock price later fell to
zero, he would not lose any more than the amount he paid for
that stock. But if the investor short sells a security (a “short”
position) and the market price of that stock keeps rising, he
continues to lose money because he is still required to replace
the borrowed stock, and this purchase will now have to be
made at a progressively higher price.33 When a stock with a
limited supply is in high demand by the market, forcing prices

naked short sale, an investor sells a stock without actually having borrowed it. When
the seller fails to deliver the stock to the purchaser, the stock has been diluted and the
transaction fails. Investopedia, Naked Shorting, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
n/nakedshorting.asp (last visited Oct.6, 2009). In July 2008, the SEC banned the naked
short sale of 19 financial stocks in reaction to the threatening credit crisis. Emergency
Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379, 42,379-80 (proposed July 15, 2008)
[hereinafter July 2008 Emergency Order]. When the SEC banned short sales on
financial stocks in September 2008, it also passed emergency measures restricting
naked short sales. Sept. 2008 Emergency Order, supra note 6, at 55,169-70. The SEC
made these emergency measures permanent in July 2009. Amendments to Regulation
SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,388, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,266, 38,266 (July, 31, 2009)
[hereinafter July 2009 Final Rule Release — Rule 204]. This footnote serves for
purposes of clarification only. Naked short selling is highly controversial, and as such,
this Note will only address the uptick rule as it relates to standard short sales and the
role of the rule in the market and in protecting investors.
30
The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing
Market Risks: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises 2 (2003), available at http://financialservices.house.
gov/media/pdf/052203ol.pdf. (testimony of Owen A. Lamont, Graduate School of
Business, University of Chicago and NBER) [hereinafter Owen A. Lamont].
31
Id. at 8.
32
Michael R. Powers et al., Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and
Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAX L. REV. 223, 246-47 & n.49 (2004).
33
Susan Lee, The Dismal Science: Short-Sellers Keep the Market Honest,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A18.

1454

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

up, a “short squeeze” may occur.34 Thus, when short sellers rush
to exit their positions, prices continue to increase, and losses to
short sellers continue to mount.35 In addition to the risk of
unlimited financial loss, if an investor is holding a short
position and dividends are declared on his borrowed stock, he
will be responsible for reimbursing the lender for the total
amount of the dividends.36
1. Reasons for the Negative Perception of Short Selling
Many observers see short selling as a “bet[] against the
team,”37 anti-economic growth,38 or “un-American” since short
sellers profit when they correctly bet that a stock’s price will
fall.39 Consequently, in times of economic trouble and difficult
world events, “shorts” are often looked upon as scapegoats,

34

Investopedia, Short Squeeze, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short
squeeze.asp (last visited October 29, 2008).
35
A recent example of a short squeeze occurred in October 2008 when
Volkswagen AG stock rose 348% in two days after Porsche announced it would take a
75% stake in VW, rather than the 50% share investors had anticipated based on
comments by Porsche executives the previous month. Gregory Zuckerman et al. VW’s
348% Two-Day Gain is Pain for Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J, Oct. 29, 2008, at C1. This
surge in VW’s share price resulted in the company having the largest market
capitalization of any public traded firm in the world at one point during the trading
day on October 28, 2008. Alexis Xydias, Porsche Gains, Volkswagen Drops on VW Stock
Supply, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=ai_m6Q0oIJ_U&refer=home. Many hedge fund investors around the
world had short positions in VW stock because they considered the stock to be
overvalued. Zuckerman, et al., supra. After the squeeze occurred, investors, who
incurred billions in losses, accused Porsche of misleading them about its plans for
investment in VW and called for an investigation into the matter by the German
securities regulator and for more disclosure requirements in German markets. Id.
Porsche owned options to purchase up to 31.5% of VW common stock; the public outcry
accusing the company of market manipulation forced it to announce that it would settle
up to 5% of its options in an attempt to increase liquidity of VW stock. Xydias, supra.
36
SEC, Short Sales, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2009).
37
See Macey et al., supra note 27, at 800 (quoting SEC Commissioner Joseph
Grundfest).
38
See Robert D. Hershey Jr., Investing; Betting That a Stock Will Drop, N.Y.
TIMES, December 7, 1986, at Sec. 3, p. 16. A bet against a stock through a short sale
could create a conflict of interest if an individual sells a stock short but is also a
shareholder and officer, director, or other employee of that company. To avoid such
conflict, the SEC restricts shorts sales by corporate officers. Kevin A. Crisp, Giving
Investors Short Shrift: How Short Sale Constraints Decrease Market Efficiency and a
Modest Proposal for Letting More Shorts Go Naked, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 135, 142 (2008).
If a corporate officer or director does not own any shares in his or her company, short
selling is prohibited, but if the officer does own shares, he may not hold any short
position for more than twenty (20) days. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2006).
39
Lamont, supra note 30, at 6.
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particularly in the wake of large stock market declines.40
During World War I, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)
imposed special restrictions on short sales because of fear that
the Germans would use the practice to manipulate and drive
down stock prices,41 and because it would harm the morale of
the market.42 In the years following the stock market crash of
1929, when Congress began developing the extensive
regulations of securities markets that are in place today, there
was even a proposal to ban short selling altogether.43 Congress
and others again called for increased scrutiny of short sales of
equity stocks after the precipitous stock market decline in
1987.44 Additionally, after the terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, U.S. and
European market regulators even investigated a spike in short
sales of airline and insurance stocks in the days leading up to
the attacks to determine if short sellers knew about the plan.45
In addition to being criticized for profiting from falling
stock prices, another reason for the vilification of short sellers
is the fear that they aim to benefit from market manipulation.46
In a “bear raid,” investors continually short sell an equity stock
in an attempt to influence “less informed” shareholders of a
negative price outlook on the security, in the hopes they will
sell off their shares.47 This is problematic because the rapid
decline of a stock price caused by market manipulation could
prompt margin calls or liquidations.48 Many investors trade on
the margin, meaning that they trade with borrowed money
40

Nasty, Brutish and Short; Short-Selling, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2008, at 46;
see also Lamont, supra note 30, at 7.
41
Id. at 8.
42
Macey et al., supra note 27, at 801.
43
Id. at 799. Representative Adolph Sabath of Illinois called short sales “the
greatest evil that has been permitted or sanctioned by the Government that I know of.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
44
Id. at 799.
45
Cassell Bryan-Low, Initial Investigation Fails to Dig Up Evidence Linking
Level of Short Selling to Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2001, at C2. The SEC
investigated thirty-eight firms whose stock was identified as having unusual trading
activity in the days before the terrorist attacks, but no connection was affirmed.
Susanne Craig, SEC Examines Trading in Firms Before Sept. 11, WALL ST. J, Oct. 3.
2001, at C1.
46
Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act
Release 54,891, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,068, 75,070 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Proposed
Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1].
47
Id.
48
Id.; see also Rob Curran & Geoffrey Rogow, Margin Calls, Redemptions
Weigh on Market, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122513281830072753.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.
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while keeping a certain level of cash with brokers as
collateral.49 Brokers and exchanges determine the level of cash
necessary, based on risk.50 Generally, declining stock prices and
increasing market volatility increase the risk of loss, prompting
brokerages to ask for more collateral. This demand is known as
a margin call.51 Often, to raise cash for margin calls, investors
sell stock which can depress prices and create a cycle which
results in another margin call.52 In addition, when investors
continue to sell stocks to raise cash for margin calls, they are
less likely to buy stocks, further depressing market prices.53
The 2008 credit crisis illustrated this fear of short
sellers manipulating the market when, once again, regulators
singled out the shorts for contributing to financial chaos.54 After
the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008 there were
accusations that short sellers spread rumors about companies
to put downward pressure on stock prices, thus allowing
investors with a short position to reap profits.55 These
accusations eventually led the SEC to issue an emergency
order in July 2008 announcing that it was going to begin
investigating whether short sellers were colluding to
manipulate the markets for their own gain.56
The subsequent failure of Lehman Brothers and
concerns about market volatility led the Commission to issue a
total ban on the short sale of financial stocks a few months
later.57 In September 2008, by installing a ban on the short sale
49

Investopedia, Margin, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/margin.asp
(last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
50
Curran & Rogow, supra note 48.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Jenny Anderson, A New Wave of Vilifying Short Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2008, at C1. During a Senate hearing probing the failure of Bear Stearns, Senator
Christopher Dodd suggested that there was collusion in the marketplace targeting the
bank. Id.
55
Id.
56
See July 2008 Emergency Order, supra note 29, at 42,379.
57
Press Release 2008-211, supra note 8. The Chicago Board of Exchange
Volatility Index (VIX) “is a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility
conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices.” Chicago Board of Exchange—Micro
Site, Introduction to VIX Futures and Options, http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/
introduction.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). The VIX is considered a barometer of
investor sentiment (it is often called the “fear index”) and uses options prices to
estimate the range of movement of the S&P 500 for the following 30 days. Tom
Lauricella & Aaron Lucchetti, Dow Slides Again, Down 514.45—S&P at a 5-Year Low;
What’s Behind the Surge in the VIX ‘Fear’ Index?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008. After
Lehman declared bankruptcy on September 16, 2008, the VIX Index rose above 30 for
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of financial stocks, the SEC sought to avert a “crisis of
confidence” resulting from sharp declines in stock prices.58 The
Commission posited that a drop in stock prices would
potentially affect the “liquidity” and “ultimate viability” of
financial institutions and damage the broader securities
market.59 Though it soon became apparent that this ban was
temporary,60 it provoked much negative reaction in the
financial community.61 Regulators in other nations soon
followed suit, hoping to prevent the volatile equities markets
from spiraling further out of control.62
Legislators are not the only ones who have criticized the
practice of short selling. Companies have also taken actions
against short sellers in a number of ways, including issuing
stock with certain restrictions that make short selling
impossible, taking legal action against short sellers, and
reporting short sellers to regulatory agencies.63 At the same
the first time since 2007, which was when the first news of a coming subprime crisis hit
the markets. The VIX remained above 30, hitting a high of 81 in October 2008. For
comparison, the VIX rose above 30 on only three trading days in 2007 (and went no
higher than 31.09). VIX Daily Closing Prices 2004-Present, Chicago Board of
Exchange, http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx (click on link to VIX data for
2004 to present) (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). The previous high for the VIX was 52.05 on
September 21, 2001, when fear was high following the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. Lauricella & Lucchetti, supra.
58
Sept. 2008 Emergency Order, supra note 8, at 55, 175.
59
Id.
60
See Scannell & Karmin, supra note 8.
61
See Jonathan Macey, The Government is Contributing to the Panic, WALL
ST. J, Oct. 11, 2008, at A15; Scannell & Karmin, supra note 8; Menachem Brenner &
Marti G. Subrahmanyam, End the Ban on Short-Selling, FORBES.COM, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/30/short-selling-ban-oped-cx_mb_1001brenner.html;
Post of David Gaffen to Market Beat, http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2008/09/19/fivereasons-why-the-short-selling-ban-stinks/?mod=rss_WSJBlog?mod=marketbeat (Sept.
19, 2008, 13:03 EST).
62
See Kara Scannell, Short Sale Ban Spreads Around Globe, Sept. 22, 2008,
at C3 (detailing implementation of short sale ban by Australia, the Netherlands and
Taiwan.).
63
Lamont, supra note 30, at 3. In a 2003 study, Professor Lamont examined
the long-term returns of 270 firms that attempted to actively discourage short selling
through threats, legal action or accusations of improper activity. Id. at 4-5. In the year
following these firms’ actions against short sellers, they had an average return
compared to the overall stock market of -24%. Id. at 3. This indicates that the short
sellers were correct and that the securities of the firms in question were overpriced. Id.
An example of a company issuing securities creatively to prevent short selling occurred
in 2006 when Pegasus Wireless granted a dividend to stockholders for every 10 shares
held; the dividend was distributed as a stock warrant, but the company refused to issue
the warrant unless investors held their shares in their own name. Jenny Anderson, A
Bet Against Those Who Bet Against the Company, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at C7.
Brokers often hold shares in their accounts (and in the broker’s name) for clients and
then lend the shares held to short sellers. Id. This dividend structure was problematic
because it forced brokers to recall the stock to prove shareholders’ identities, which put
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time that the SEC announced the temporary ban on short
selling of financial stocks in 2008, it also enacted a rule that
required hedge funds and other institutional investors to
disclose which companies’ securities they were holding short.64
This provoked an immediate backlash from the investment
community over concerns that company executives would no
longer provide information to investors who were known to be
shorting their company’s stock.65 The SEC eventually backed
down from this rule over the investors’ concerns.66
2. The Positive Effect of Short Selling on the Markets
Despite the persistent animosity toward shorts during
troubled economic times, short sales of securities do have
several positive effects on stock markets. Two of the most
important areas of the market that are positively affected by
short selling are “pricing efficiency” and “liquidity.”67 If stock
markets were perfectly efficient, short sales would not be
necessary because all stocks would be correctly valued.68
However, since markets are in fact imperfect, short sales can
help correct inefficiencies created by “asymmetric information,
taxes, or other imperfections” by moving prices closer to
equilibrium.69 This is because a short sale is an investor’s way
of “inform[ing] the market of [his negative] evaluation of future

a short squeeze on the stock. Id. The CEO of Pegasus claimed that these actions were
taken not to harm short sellers but because the company was concerned that phantom
(fake) shares of its stock were being traded. Id. Nonetheless, the company’s share price
rose 30% after the warrant plan was announced. Id.
64
See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2), Short Sale Disclosure,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169, 55,170 (Sept. 18, 2008).
65
One prominent investor, Jim Chanos, called the SEC’s rule “akin to the
government suddenly requiring Coca-Cola to disclose their secret formula for free to all
their competitors.” Beth Healy & Ross Kerber, Short-sellers Cry Foul After Ban,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 2008, (internal quotation marks omitted).
66
See Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Positions by Institutional
Investment Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 58,785, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,678, 61,679
(Oct. 17, 2008). The SEC still required investment funds to disclose short positions, but
decided to make this information nonpublic; the requirement ended on Oct. 19, 2008.
Id.
67
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,069.
68
The efficient market theory posits that in an efficient market, all investors
would have perfect information, thus investments would be properly valued and as a
result, short selling would be unnecessary. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE
FINANCE 15 (6th ed. 2008).
69
See Powers et al., supra note 32, at 235-36.
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stock price performance.”70 Many feel that short sellers keep
exuberance in check and help to quiet “noise traders.”71
Moreover, short sellers provide liquidity because not only must
shorts cover their sales by buying stocks,72 but an investor may
also be more willing to take a bigger risk on a long position if
he can hedge himself with a short position.73 In 1931, Richard
Whitney, then-President of the NYSE, testified before Congress
that he believed the exchange would have been forced to close
after the 1929 stock market crash if it were not for the
willingness of short sellers, the only investors that made money
when the NYSE crashed, to put their money back into the
depressed market after stock prices dropped.74
The perceived skepticism or pessimism of short sellers
plays a very important role in the market. Short sellers are
often among the first to detect corporate fraud and were among
the first to issue warnings about ill-fated companies such as
Enron and Tyco.75 Since many short sellers are among the most
informed and sophisticated investors, they may perceive
financial malfeasance before market regulators, despite the
best attempts of the SEC and other regulatory agencies to keep
tabs on companies. Individual investors that research the
fundamentals of a company and its stock, operating only with
an eye for profit, may simply have more resources and perhaps
more motivation to delve into the details of a firm’s financial
information when making an investment decision.76

70

2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,070.
71
Crisp, supra note 38, at 142. Noise traders act “for reasons generally
unrelated to an accurate measure of an asset’s fundamental value. . . . [and] might act
on market momentum, misinformation or poor strategy.” Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
An overly positive view on a stock is less likely to be challenged than a view that is
excessively negative. See Powers et al., supra note 32, at 241.
72
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,069.
73
See Macey et al., supra note 27, at 800.
74
Id. at 801-02.
75
See Anderson, supra note 54. Jim Chanos, who runs one of the largest
short funds in the world for Kynikos Associates, calls short sellers “financial
detectives.” Nasty, Brutish and Short, supra note 40, at 46 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Coincidentally, Mr. Chanos is also credited for being one of the first skeptics
of Enron’s financial statements. Id.
76
See Richard Sauer, Bring on the Bears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A25
(“By putting their money where their mouths are, short sellers are the only market
participants with an incentive to deflate bubbles and inject pessimistic information into
the market.”).
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The History of the Uptick Rule—1938-2007

Considering the historic sentiment against short selling,
it is not surprising that following the 1929 market crash, short
selling was a concern to legislators.77 However, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) did not specifically
govern short sales; it instead delegated regulation of short
selling to the SEC.78 In 1934, the newly-created SEC released a
list of rule recommendations for adoption by national
exchanges.79 One of the sixteen rules recommended was to
prohibit the short sale of a security at a price below the last
previous sale price of that security.80 The SEC believed this
formulation of the short selling rule would prevent abusive
short selling on exchanges while also “preserv[ing] those
features of short selling which are in the public interest.”81
Thus, the rule would protect the investing public while
enabling markets to operate unhindered, allowing them to reap
the inherent benefits of short selling.
After a decline in the market in the fall of 1937, the
SEC undertook a study to examine whether short selling
exacerbated the drop in stock prices.82 Though several studies of
short selling were still under way at the time, the SEC released
some data publicly in January 1938 that suggested that short
selling increased in a declining market and that in such a

77

Macey et al., supra note 27, at 801-03.
Id. at 802-03. Regulatory power over short selling is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (a)(1) (2006). This provision states:
78

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange – (a) (1) To effect a short sale, or
to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with the purchase or sale,
of any security registered on a national securities exchange, in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
79

See FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 16, at 40-44.
OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SEC, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE
PRICE RESTRICTIONS UNDER REGULATION SHO PILOT 12 (2007), http://www.sec.
gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf [hereinafter OEA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
The SEC recommended as its Sixteenth Rule governing exchanges that “[n]o member
shall use any facility of the exchange to effect on the exchange a short sale of any
security in the unit of trading at a price below the last sale price of such security on the
exchange,” but the rule was not implemented at that time. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE SEC, supra note 13, at 44.
81
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 16, at 16.
82
Exchange Act Release No. 1548, 1938 WL 32911, *1 (Jan. 24, 1938).
80
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market, “short sales are seriously destructive of stability.”83 It
was based on this limited information that the SEC concluded
that short selling needed to be further regulated, and it
adopted a set of rules, effective February 8, 1938, which
attempted to “prohibit short selling in a declining market.”84
These rules included the uptick rule,85 previously recommended
for adoption by the exchanges, as well as a rule that all sell
orders be marked “short” or “long.”86 It is notable that when the
SEC implemented this rule change, it made clear that it
wished to formulate the short selling rules in such a way as to
“avoid placing undue burden or inconvenience on transactions,”
and that it would revisit the necessity of these rules if they
were deemed unnecessary by the Commission’s ongoing studies
or if they had a negative impact on the market.87
The 1938 version of the uptick rule went virtually
unchanged until the SEC removed all price test rules for short
sales in July 2007.88 In 1939, the SEC modified the rule slightly
to allow short selling on a zero uptick, making a short sale
permissible if the sale occurred at the same price as the last
trade, if the price of the next-to-last trade was an uptick.89 The

83

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
85
Id. at *2 (Rule X-10A- 1(a)). A tick refers to a move upward or downward in
the price of a security.
86
Id. (Rule X-10A-1(b)).
87
Id. at *1. The 1937 study has been criticized as inadequate due to its
limited scope and the short time frame for which it was performed. Short Sales of
Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,533 (Dec. 28,
1976). In addition, after the tick rule was implemented, no further data compiled from
the 1937 study was publicly released despite being promised in the initial report. Id.
88
The “downtick” and “uptick” distinction is a matter of semantics. The early
(downtick) version of the rule prevented a short sale when the last price movement was
downward, while the later (uptick) version of the rule prohibits a short sale at a price
that is not at a tick price higher than the last previous trade. See Exchange Act Release
No. 1548, 1938 WL 32911, supra note 82, at *1 (“No person shall . . . effect a short sale
of any security at or below the price at which the last sale thereof, regular way, was
effected on such exchange.”).
89
An illustration of the zero plus tick test and compliance with Rule 10a-1 in
a sale sequence follows:
84

Last sale: 47
Next sale: 47.04 — Plus tick compared to last trade; short sale permitted
Next sale: 47.04 — Zero-plus tick compared to next-to-last trade; short sale
permitted
Next Sale: 47.00 — Minus tick compared to next-to-last trade; no short sale
permitted
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SEC felt that this rule met three important objectives: (1) it did
not unfairly restrict short sales when the market was
increasing; (2) it prevented bear raiders from driving down
prices in a declining market; and (3) it prevented short sellers
from using all bids at one price level, thereby causing long
sellers to set progressively lower prices.90 The uptick rule
applied to all securities registered on national securities
exchanges and also regulated trades of securities “admitted to
unlisted trading privileges”91 on national securities exchanges,
if the trades were reported in accordance with an “effective
transaction reporting plan.”92 However, the uptick rule did not
apply to over-the-counter bulletin board securities or pink
sheets, as neither of these types of securities are traded on a
national exchange.93
The short sale price test rule operated slightly
differently as applied to securities trading on the National
Association of Securities Dealers Global Market (NASDAQ).94
Before becoming a national securities exchange, the NASDAQ
operated a price test for short selling called a bid test.95 The bid
test did not allow short sales at or below the current highest
bid when that bid was less than the previous highest bid.96
When the NASDAQ applied to the SEC to become a national
exchange in January 2006, it requested, and received, an
Next Sale: 47.00 — Zero-minus tick compared to next to last trade; no short
sale permitted
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra note 46, at
75,070.
90
See id. (citation omitted); Macey et al., supra note 27, at 803-04 (citation
omitted).
91
17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(a)(1)(i) (2007).
92
Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Effective transaction reporting plan
means any transaction reporting plan approved by the Commission pursuant to
§ 242.601.” 17 C.F.R § 242.600(b)(22). Section 242.601 describes minimum reporting
requirements for securities transactions. See 17 C.F.R § 242.601 (2007).
93
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,070. Over-the-counter bulletin board securities (OTCBB) are generally
small, risky, and traded infrequently. Investopedia, Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board
(OTCBB), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/otcbb.asp (last visited November 5,
2008). There are no listing requirements to trade on the OTCBB, though companies
must file financial statements with the SEC. Id. Pink sheets are securities that are not
traded on an exchange, do not have listing requirements and are not required to file
with the SEC. Investopedia, Pink Sheets, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pink
sheets.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
94
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,070-71.
95
Id. The SEC granted temporary approval in 1994 for the NASD to use this
bid test (former NASD Rule 3350). Id.
96
Id. at 75,071 & n.29.
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exemption from the uptick rule.97 The bid test remained in
place until the repeal of all short sale price tests in 2007.98
Though the NASDAQ-listed securities were technically exempt
from the uptick rule, these securities were still regulated by a
price test.
To enforce the uptick rule the SEC used a marking
requirement. When stock trades were executed, each order
placed with a broker-dealer had to be marked as “short” or
“long.”99 As such, if an investor mismarked a trade as a
purchase of shares for a long position, but actually purchased a
short position, and did not observe the price test requirement of
the uptick rule, the investor would be found in violation of Rule
10a-1. For example, the SEC brought an enforcement action
against Sandell Asset Management after the firm began short
selling shares of Hibernia Corporation, a New Orleans bank
holding company, immediately after Hurricane Katrina.100
Sandell “held a large long position in Hibernia.”101 The firm was
apparently concerned that the natural disaster would decrease
the offer price for Hibernia in a pending acquisition of the bank
by another company.102 To protect Sandell against potential
losses if the acquisition deal fell through, Sandell employees
allegedly tried to short sell as many shares as possible to hedge
its Hibernia investment and in the process, “short” sale orders
were falsely marked as “long” sale orders.103
Until its repeal in 2007, the uptick rule was in place as
a backstop to regulate harmful or manipulative short selling in
a declining market for nearly as long as the existence of the
97

Id. at 75,071.
Id. The SEC granted this exemption in large part due to the fact it was in
the process of conducting a Pilot to study the effect of removing a short sale price test
rule. Id.; see also infra Part III. The Commission did not want to jeopardize the quality
of the pilot data or impose costs on the NASDAQ to implement a rule when it was
possible the rule would be temporary. 2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO
and Rule 10a-1, supra note 46, at 75,071. After the NASDAQ was accepted as a
national exchange, the bid test was codified as NASD Rule 5100. At this time, the SEC
also exempted NASDAQ securities, newly listed on a national exchange, from the bid
test when traded on non-national exchanges. Id.
99
See Regulation of Short Sales, 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(g) (2007). If the sale of a
stock was subject to a particular exemption from the uptick rule, the order was
required to be marked “short exempt.” Id. § 242.200(g)(2).
100
Press Release 2007-216, SEC, SEC Charges New York Hedge Fund Adviser
With Short Sale Violations in Connection With Hibernia-Capital One Merger (Oct. 10,
2007), http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-216.htm. Sandell Asset Management settled
with the SEC for approximately $8 million without admitting or denying the charges. Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
98
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SEC itself.104 However, as a result of market modernization and
a growing list of exceptions to the rule, the SEC sought to
revisit whether the rule needed to be modified to fit the trading
practices of the twenty-first century.105
III.

THE REPEAL OF THE UPTICK RULE AND RENEWED
CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE TEST RULE

The uptick rule has been considered controversial for
decades. During the seventy years the uptick rule was in effect,
the SEC studied its efficacy and necessity on several occasions,
but it made no significant changes to the rule until its repeal in
2007. In addition to studying the effects of short selling on the
market crash in fall 1938, another extensive study was
performed in 1962.106 Between 1939 and 1963, the NYSE
lobbied unsuccessfully for the SEC to change the price test rule
and allow short sales of a security at any price, so long as that
price was higher than the closing price of the security on the
previous trading day.107 The necessity of this rule was examined
again in 1976.108 Given the history of the uptick rule, it was no
surprise that when the SEC issued a Concept Release in 1999
in order to garner public comments on the short selling rules in
an effort to “modernize” regulation of short selling, it received
more than 2700 comment letters.109
A.

The 2007 Repeal of the Uptick Rule

The SEC felt it was necessary to re-examine the short
selling rules due to several market developments, including the
104

Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,972, 62,972
(Nov. 6, 2003).
105
See id. at 62,973.
106
Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, supra note 87,
at 56,534. The Special Study, published in 1963, was more extensive than the 1937
study and concluded that while short sales as a percentage of total market volume
increased in a declining market, the tick rule should be accompanied by a rule to “cope”
with short selling during market declines because plus and zero plus ticks could occur
in “sharply declining markets.” Id.
107
The uptick rule only applied to transactions on national exchanges
regulated by the SEC (such as the New York Stock Exchange) and to securities traded
on national exchanges. Thus the rule did not apply to over the counter (OTC) sales of
securities that are not traded on an exchange. See David C. Worley, The Regulation of
Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (1990).
108
Short Sales of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, supra note 87,
at 56,530.
109
Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, supra note 104, at 62,973.
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increase in NASDAQ-listed securities trading off that market,
the impact of electronic trading and decimalization, and the
effect of the now-commonplace practice of trading of options.110
There was also speculation that hedge funds heavily pressured
the SEC to re-evaluate the short selling regulations.111
In 2003, after receiving and examining comments on its
1999 Concept Release, the SEC submitted Regulation SHO for
public consideration.112 Rather than rescind the uptick rule
immediately, Regulation SHO proposed a pilot test period (the
“Pilot”) during which time the uptick rule would be
inapplicable to certain stocks.113 This would allow the SEC to
obtain and study information about the trading activity for
stocks not subject to a short sale price test.114 After an initial
delay, the Pilot began in May 2005.115 Although the test was
supposed to end in April 2006, the SEC extended the Pilot until
August 2007 to give the Commission enough time to evaluate
the data and determine whether to modify or repeal the price
test rules in place.116 The Pilot exempted approximately 1000
stocks, chosen from the Russell 3000 Index, from the uptick
rule.117 The SEC selected the Pilot stocks using a methodology
that it felt would “giv[e] due consideration to the liquidity,
volatility, market depth and trading market of these
securities.”118
110

See id.
See Jeff Benjamin, Did Repeal of the Uptick Rule Unleash Market Havoc?
Surge of Volatility, Rising Number of Short Sales Cited as Evidence, 11 INV. NEWS 3, 3
(2007).
112
Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, supra note 104, at 62,973.
113
Id. at 62,983.
114
Id.
115
Order Extending Term of Short Sale Pilot, Exchange Act Release No.
53,684, 71 Fed. Reg. 24,765, 24,765 (proposed Apr. 20, 2006).
116
Id. The primary reason for the extension was to prevent securities markets
from having to make costly modifications to their systems and procedures more than
once in the event the Commission decided to repeal a short sale price test rule. Id. The
end of the Pilot coincided with the expiration of the temporary order suspending price
tests. Id.
117
Order Suspending the Operation of Short Sale Price Provisions, Exchange
Act Release No. 50,104, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,032, 48,032 (proposed July 28, 2004). The
Russell 3000 Index includes the largest 3000 U.S. companies and its composition is
updated annually. Russell 3000 Index Fact Sheet, http://www.russell.com/Indexes/
characteristics_fact_sheets/us/Russell_3000_Index.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); see
also OEA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at 23.
118
Order Suspending the Operation of Short Sale Price Provisions, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 48,032. The securities included in the Pilot were chosen from the Russell 3000
as of June 25, 2004 and the test group included only those stocks subject to Rule 10(a)(1), which were all those traded on the NASDAQ and those listed on the NYSE or
American Stock Exchange (Amex). Id. The stocks were grouped by the three exchanges
111
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Following the conclusion of the first year of the Pilot
period, the SEC Office of Economic Analysis (“OEA”) analyzed
the Pilot data and issued a report in early 2007 to assist the
Commission in deciding whether to repeal the price test rule, to
install an alternative price test, or to retain the price test
already in place.119 Based on the results of the OEA’s analysis, a
public roundtable discussing the OEA report, and four
additional studies performed by independent parties, the SEC
concluded that “[g]enerally, the Pilot Results supported
removal of current price test restrictions.”120 The Pilot data
revealed little relationship between “manipulative short
selling” and the restrictions imposed by the uptick rule.121
Another factor that contributed to the SEC’s decision to
reconsider and eventually repeal the uptick rule was the
Commission’s goal of creating a “more consistent regulatory
environment for short selling.”122 During the nearly seventy
years the uptick rule was in effect, the SEC granted numerous
exceptions to the rule, primarily as a result of the
modernization of the markets and the evolution of trading
practices.123 Generally, the SEC allowed statutory or written
exemptions for types of transactions that the uptick rule was
not designed to prevent or for activities that were not deemed
abusive.124 For example, a statutory exception to the uptick rule
was granted for exchange-traded funds, and another was
and then ranked by “average daily dollar volume” during the preceding year. Id. Every
third stock (beginning with the second stock on the list), was then chosen in order to
have “a more representative daily dollar volume sample.” Id at 48,032, n.7. 50% of the
test stocks were listed on NYSE, 2.2% on the Amex, and 47.8% on the NNM. Id. at
48,032. The approximately 2000 stocks in the index not chosen for the Pilot constituted
the control group and the percentage distribution across the three exchanges were
nearly identical. Id.
119
See Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at
36,349, n.17.
120
Id. at 36,349. See generally OEA ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 80.
Though much of the economic analysis in this report is beyond the legal scope of this
Note, the conclusions of the report that the SEC utilized in determining to rescind the
uptick rule will be discussed in this Part and infra Part V.
121
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,073.
122
Id. at 75,068.
123
Id. at 75,071. The statutory exceptions to the uptick rule can be found in
section e of Rule 10a-1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(e)(1)-(12) (2007). The SEC may also
exempt transactions from the uptick rule upon “written request.” See 17. C.F.R.
§ 240.10a-1(f) (“This rule shall not prohibit any transaction or transaction which the
Commission, upon written request or upon its own motion, exempts, either
unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions.”).
124
Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 42,037, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,996, 57,99798 (Oct. 28, 1999).
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granted to allow market makers and specialists to sell short on
a zero minus tick, to ensure maintenance of prices and market
liquidity.125 In addition to these exceptions, in 2000-2001, U.S.
securities markets implemented decimalization, which changed
th
the pricing of shares from 1/16 minimum increments to $.01
increments.126 In a decimalized trading environment, one tick of
a stock price now had a value of $.01 as compared to the old
th
minimum tick of 1/16 of one dollar, or $.0625. In repealing the
rule, the SEC and other critics of the uptick rule argued that
decimalization made the rule less effective since a penny tick
test would be less effective at slowing down short sellers.127
The SEC also felt repealing the uptick rule was
necessary to prevent exchange arbitrage. This is because
regulatory differences between exchanges could put exchanges
with a price test rule at a competitive disadvantage to
exchanges without such a rule.128 For example, in 1985, the
NYSE publicized that it wanted the price test rule relaxed in
order to combat competition from the London Stock Exchange,
an exchange without a short sale price test.129 As financial
markets have continued to globalize over the past twenty
years, this competition still exists. The results of the Pilot lent
support to these concerns, as it indicated that short selling as a
portion of total volume increased by 2% in the absence of price
test restrictions.130 The Commission construed this data to
mean that investors could be more inclined to conduct their
short sale transactions at market centers without short sale
price tests.131

125

2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,072.
126
See Testimony Concerning the Effects of Decimalization on the Securities
Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and Investment Comm. on Banking,
Hous. and Urban Aff., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chair,
U.S. SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/052401tslu.htm.
127
See April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,061
(“[T]he Commission noted [at the time of repeal of the uptick rule] that decimal
increments had resulted in a rule that was no longer suited to the wide variety of
trading strategies and systems used in the marketplace.”).
128
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,075.
129
Macey et al., supra note 27, at 804.
130
OEA PILOT STUDY, supra note 80, at 35.
131
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,075; see also OEA PILOT STUDY, supra note 80, at 35-36.
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Whether hedge funds influenced the SEC’s decision to
remove price test restrictions on short selling is debatable.132
But the timing of the Pilot test and the repeal of the uptick rule
certainly coincided with the ascension of hedge funds.133 While
there is no agreed-upon, clear-cut definition of a hedge fund,134
managers of these private investment funds often rely heavily
on short selling as an investment strategy.135 Traditional
investment companies, which are regulated by the Investment
Company Act,136 are subject to stringent rules requiring
extensive disclosure of short sales in the companies’ investor
prospectuses and annual reports.137 Because hedge funds are
not subject to the same regulation, the growth of hedge funds
likely increased the visibility and incidence of short selling
since they may freely use short selling strategies to maximize
returns.138 Predictably, hedge funds were publicly supportive of
both the SEC’s initial 2003 proposal suggesting the Pilot
study,139 and the 2006 proposal to repeal the uptick rule.140
132

See Benjamin, supra note 111, at 3; Editorial, Opposing Uptick Rule is
Truly Short-Sighted, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 16, 2008, at A10.
133
Hedge fund employees are famously secretive about their investments and
strategies, partly due to the competitive nature of the industry and partly because they
raise funds privately, without advertising or public solicitation. Jenny Anderson, Hedge
Funds Walk a Hard Line Between Silence and Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at
C7. Private fundraising means that hedge funds fall outside the scope of the Securities
Act of 1933. Id. This secrecy and the fact that there are no public reporting
requirements make it difficult to estimate the precise increase in the amount of assets
under management by hedge funds. However, for the sake of perspective, one estimate
approximates that the number of global assets under management in hedge funds
increased from “$50 billion in 1990 to approximately $1 trillion at the end of 2004.”
Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
80, 80 (2005). In 2003, the “significant growth” of hedge funds prompted the SEC to
compile a report to study implications of this growth given the “lack of information”
available about hedge funds. SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC. EXCH. COMM’N,
IMPLICATION OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS vii (2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
134
In a 2003 Staff Report, the SEC provided its general definition, calling a
hedge fund “an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose
interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an
investment company under the Investment Company Act.” SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 133, at 3.
135
See id. at 5.
136
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006).
137
SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 133, at 43,
n.147.
138
Id. at 42-43.
139
See Letter from John G. Gaine, President, Managed Funds Assoc., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 26, 2004) (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s72303/managedfunds012604.htm). On behalf of the Managed Funds Association, an
organization which represents an industry group of alternative investment fund
professionals (including those employed by some of the largest hedge funds), Mr. Gaine
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However, despite initially strongly supporting the SEC’s
decision to repeal the uptick rule, some hedge funds lobbied for
the reinstatement of the rule once the SEC imposed the
emergency ban on short sales in September 2008.141 These calls
by hedge funds to reinstate the uptick rule came fast and
furious after the SEC banned short sales and began requiring
funds to disclose short positions.142 This outcry over the
disclosure requirement was part of the reason the SEC
softened its stance and modified the regulations slightly so that
only short positions in excess of a fair market value of $10
million had to be reported (as opposed to the initial
requirement of $1 million).143
In 2006, the SEC announced a proposal to repeal the
uptick rule and solicited another round of public comments,
most of which were in favor of the rule change.144 The comments
submitted were mostly in line with the SEC’s view expressed in
the proposal, pointing out that improvement in market
surveillance and transparency rendered the backstop of a price
test rule unnecessary.145 The comments asserted that the
elimination of price test restrictions would allow the market to
benefit from the merits of short selling, such as pricing
efficiency and liquidity, while eliminating investors’
operational costs directly associated with compliance with the
rule.146 Interestingly, two individual investors urged the SEC to
keep the uptick rule in place to prevent bear raids.147 Another
comment letter from a finance professor agreed vigorously with
the SEC’s decision, but also made an interesting point that
perhaps if more short sale data were publicly available, shorts
“encourage[d] the Commission to . . . move expeditiously toward the complete removal
of short sale price regulation.” Id.
140
See Letter from John G. Gaine, President, Managed Funds Assoc., to
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 12, 2007) (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-2106/s72106-31.pdf) (urging the SEC to repeal all price test restrictions and applauding
its efforts “towards removing obsolete and unnecessary regulations”).
141
See Anuj Gangahar & Joann Chung, Funds Want ‘Uptick’ Rule Back, FIN.
TIMES.COM, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0362e760-8b24-11dd-b6340000779fd18c,s01=1.html; Healy & Kerber, supra note 65.
142
See Healy & Kerber, supra note 65.
143
See Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Positions By Institutional
Investment Managers, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 58,785, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,678,
61,680 (Oct. 17, 2008).
144
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at
36,350.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
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would not always be the first parties blamed during market
declines.148
One comment letter the NYSE submitted following the
announcement of the proposal to repeal the uptick rule was
particularly notable. The NYSE expressed concern that the
entire Pilot test took place during a period in which the market
was relatively stable.149 As such, the NYSE noted that removal
of the rule during a period of “unusually rapid and large
market decline” could not be measured.150 Conversely, when the
SEC established the rule in 1938, it did so in part based on a
study of two one week periods in September and October of
1938 that were “characterized by a large volume of trading,
erratic intermediate price movements and intensive
liquidation.”151 The NYSE also expressed its belief that national
exchanges should have the option to suggest price-testing rules
in unstable markets.152 Not surprisingly, immediately following
the SEC’s ban on short selling of financial stocks in 2008, the
Chief Executive of the NYSE, Duncan Niederauer, publicly
announced that he favored the return of the uptick rule,
especially in volatile market conditions.153
B.

The SEC’s Reconsideration of the Uptick Rule

Following the financial upheaval in 2008 and the
appointment and confirmation of a new SEC Chairman in
2009, revisiting the regulation of short selling was an
immediate priority for the SEC, due to the “extreme market
conditions” and “deterioration in investor confidence.”154 In
April 2009, the SEC sought comment on its proposal of two
different approaches to regulate short selling.155 The extensive
148

Letter from James J. Angel, Assoc. Prof. of Fin., Georgetown Univ., to
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, S.E.C (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-2106/s72106-35.pdf.
149
See Letter from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy
M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-06/s7210634.pdf.
150
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1 Final Rule Release, supra note 9, at
36,350; see also Letter from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy
M. Morris, supra note 149.
151
Exchange Act Release No. 1548, 1938 WL 32911, supra note 82, at *1.
152
Letter from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy M.
Morris, supra note 149.
153
Geoffrey Rogow, NYSE Chief Leans Toward Uptick Rule, WALL ST. J., Oct.
2, 2008, at C5.
154
April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,043.
155
See id. at 18,042.
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proposal detailed the approaches and included nearly two
hundred questions for commenters to consider related to the
proposed rules when providing feedback.156 The SEC received
approximately four thousand comment letters regarding these
proposals.157 Predictably, there was a wide range of responses,
with many institutional commenters expressing concern that a
short sale price test would have a deleterious effect on the
efficiency and liquidity of the market,158 and many others
urging the reinstatement of a price test regulation.159 This
volume of responses helped prompt the announcement of a
second public comment period in August 2009, proposing an
additional version of a price test rule.160 In connection with the
proposed rule releases, the SEC held a roundtable to discuss
short sale price test regulation in May 2009 with various
industry professionals.161
The SEC suggested two different regulatory schemes in
April 2009, the market-wide approach, with a permanent rule
regulating short selling, and the circuit breaker approach that
would implement a short selling regulation once the price of a
security dropped precipitously, and could operate in
conjunction with a market-wide or price test rule, or stand
alone.162 As to the market-wide approach, the SEC solicited
comments on two different price test rules, the “proposed
uptick rule,” similar to the repealed Rule 10a-1 and the
“proposed modified uptick rule,” similar to the bid test used by
156

See generally id.
Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No, 34-60,509, 74
Fed. Reg. 42,033, 42,033 (Aug. 20, 2009) [hereinafter August 2009 Amendments to
Regulation SHO].
158
See, e.g., Letter from Richard Chase, Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Royal
Bank of Can. Capital Markets Corp., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-4665.pdf; Letter from Paul
M. Russo, Managing Dir., Head of U.S. Equity Trading, Goldman, Sachs & Co., to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (June 19, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-08-09/s70809-3809.pdf.
159
See, e.g., Letter from Edward D. Herlihy and Theodore A. Levine, Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (June 17, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-3690.pdf; E-mail from Glen Shipway to
SEC, (June, 19, 2009) (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-3795.pdf).
160
August 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 157, at 42,033.
161
See generally SEC, Roundtable to Discuss Short Sale Price Tests and Short
Sale Circuit Breakers, May 5, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales/round
table050509/shortsalesroundtable050509-transcript.pdf.
Roundtable
participants
included bankers, traders, regulators, economists, lawyers, and academics. SEC,
Panelists’ Biographies, Roundtable to Discuss Short Sale Price Tests and Short Sale
Circuit Breakers, May 5, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales/roundtable
050509/bios.htm.
162
April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,043.
157
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NASDAQ before it became a national exchange.163 The
Commission also suggested two alternative rules for the circuit
breaker approach.164 The first is a “proposed circuit breaker halt
rule” that would be “triggered by a severe price decline” in a
stock and prohibit any short selling of that security.165 The
second is a “circuit breaker price test rule[]” that would take
effect when the price of a stock declined, while still allowing
investors to short sell the security.166 Additionally, two
alternative circuit breaker price test rules, the “proposed
circuit breaker uptick rule” and the “proposed circuit breaker
modified uptick rule,” were also suggested, paralleling the price
test rules discussed under the market-wide approach.167 The
SEC also discussed an “alternative uptick rule” in April 2009,
but did not seek formal comment on this proposed regulation
until August 2009.168 The alternative uptick rule is a price test
rule that could be utilized in either a market-wide approach or
a circuit breaker approach and would allow short selling of a
stock only “at a price above the current national best bid.”169
Before determining how to act, the SEC stated that it
would also evaluate empirical data as it became available.170
The OEA had provided the Commission some preliminary data
analyzing how a short sale price test would have affected the
markets and whether short selling created downward pressure
on stock prices during September 2008, at the height of the
credit crisis.171 The SEC’s April 2009 proposal noted that the
requests it received urging reinstatement of the uptick rule had
not included any empirical data in support of these requests,
but that it was “looking forward to receiving analysis of
relevant data” related to the market effects of a price test rule,
and the “costs and benefits of reinstating” some type of price
test or circuit breaker rule.172
In late February 2010, the SEC announced that it voted
to adopt an alternative uptick rule that would take effect if a
163

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also notes 88-89, 94-96 and
accompanying text.
164
April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,043.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
August 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 157, at 42,033.
169
Id.
170
See April 2009 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 4, at 18,049.
171
See id.
172
Id.
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stock traded down more than ten percent in a day.173 Once the
ten percent decline threshold is reached, short selling may
occur only at a price above the best bid.174 During both of the
2009 comment periods, the SEC received a plethora of
empirical data, but it did not point to any particular study that
it found to be especially persuasive and conclusive when it
implemented the new rule.175 This new regulation, Rule 201,
will have broad coverage and “generally cover all securities . . .
listed on a national exchange.”176 Once the price of a security
declines 10%, the trading limits will continue in effect for the
rest of the trading day as well as the following day.177 In
enacting Rule 201, the SEC aims to regulate manipulative
short selling and maintain investor confidence without
“hav[ing] any negative effect on market liquidity and price
efficiency.”178
IV.

REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING IN THE ABSENCE OF A
PRICE TEST RULE

Upon announcing its decision to repeal the uptick rule
in 2007, the SEC made sure to point to other statutes and
regulations that enable the agency to police abusive short
selling practices in the absence of a price test rule.179 Even
without the uptick rule, it is still illegal to short sell stocks in
contravention of the other securities rules and regulations.180
These statutes and rules were likewise enacted to protect
investors and to maintain stable markets, and are the same
regulations the agency would have used to enforce price
manipulation and fraud through short selling even if the uptick
rule were in place.

173

See Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Restricts Short-Selling and Addresses a Global
Accounting Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at B3.
174
See id; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
175
2010 Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 21, at 11,241-44.
176
Id. at 11,245. Options are not covered by Rule 201. Id.
177
Id. at 11,244.
178
Id. at 11,248.
179
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,069 n.16. In addition to the laws discussed in this Part, the SEC also
regulates short sales in connection with public securities offerings in Regulation M,
Rule 105. Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.105 (2009). Public offerings have specific
regulations that differ from rules that govern day-to-day trading activities. See
Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.100-105 (2009).
180
See supra note 78.
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The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) section
17(a) is an anti-fraud provision that prohibits the use of
interstate commerce to effect “fraud or deceit” through the sale
of securities. 181 A violation of subsection (a)(1) of this provision
requires scienter.182 The Exchange Act also has two provisions
that can be utilized to regulate abusive short selling. The first,
section 9(a), prohibits the manipulation of securities prices,
although this section applies only to securities listed on an
exchange.183 The second provision, section 10(b), prohibits the
use of any “manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities and applies to any
security, whether exchange-listed or not.184 Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act is extremely important in SEC enforcement
because it is the general “catch-all” regulation that the SEC
uses to implement needed rules to protect the investing
public.185 The SEC enforces section 10(b) through Rule 10b-5.186
The activities proscribed under Rule 10b-5 are similar to those
proscribed under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, but Rule
10b-5 is the farthest reaching anti-fraud rule promulgated by
the Exchange Act, since it applies to any security.187
Section 9(a) of the Exchange Act is the most important
provision prohibiting price manipulation of securities listed on
a national exchange.188 Since the securities of the largest and
most frequently-traded companies are listed on national
exchanges like the NYSE and the NASDAQ, this provision has
bite. Several subsections of section 9(a) can be applied to
manipulative short selling.189 The primary anti-manipulation
181

Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006).
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
183
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2000).
184
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
185
Joseph I. Goldstein et al., An Overview of Market Manipulation: Legal and
Practical Aspects, in SECOND ANNUAL MARKET MANIPULATION 99, 105 (Joseph I.
Goldstein et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter An Overview of Market Manipulation]
(“[§ 10(b)] is a broad ‘catch-all’ provision that empowers the Commission to prescribe
rules that it deems necessary and appropriate to protect investors and the public
interest.” (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976))).
186
Id. at 105.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 103.
189
Section 9(a)(1) primarily applies to “wash sales” and “matched orders.” Id.
at 104. A wash sale is a transaction “which involves no change in the beneficial
ownership” of a security. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(a)(1)(A) (2006). A matched order occurs when a purchaser (or seller) of a security
enters an order for the purchase (or sale) of that security, when he knows that another
party will be ordering a sale (or purchase) in the same security “at substantially the
182
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provision is subsection 9(a)(2).190 To establish a violation of this
provision, the SEC or the plaintiff191 must establish that: 1) a
person made “a series of transactions in any security”; 2) that
those transactions resulted either “in actual or apparent active
trading in such security” or in a rise or decline in the price of
such security; and 3) that the transactions were made “for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by
others.”192 Section 9(a)(2) also requires the plaintiff to establish
manipulative intent.193 A would-be violation of section 9(a)(2)
that is effected with a security not listed on an exchange is a
violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act.194
Other provisions of section 9(a) that are relevant to the
regulation of short selling include subsections 9(a)(3) and
9(a)(4), both of which apply to broker-dealers, as well as anyone
else trading (purchasing or selling) stocks.195 Subsection 9(a)(3)
prohibits any trader of a listed security from “inducing the
purchase or sale” of a security by “circulating or disseminating
information that market activity may occur that will cause the
security’s price to rise or fall.”196 Subsection 9(a)(4) prohibits
same size, at substantially the same time, and at substantially the same price.” Id.
§ 9(a)(1)(B).
190
Manipulation of securities prices is a “term of art” that is defined in
different ways. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (“[Manipulation]
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by
controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.” (citation omitted)); see also In
re Pagel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22,280, 33 SEC Docket 1003, 1985 WL
548387, at *3 (1985) (“In essence, a manipulation is intentional interference with the
free forces of supply and demand.” (citation omitted)).
191
There is a statutorily provided private cause of action for any person who
“purchase[s] or sell[s] any security” that was “affected by [an] act or transaction” in
violation of Exchange Act § 9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)
(2006).
192
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2006). A
plaintiff in a private cause of action would also be required to prove that he relied on
the transactions in question and that the transactions affected the plaintiff’s purchase
or selling price. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, 682 F.2d 1149, 1164 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
193
In re Sharon M. Graham, Initial Decision Release No. 82, 1995 SEC Lexis
3457, at *26 (Dec. 28, 1995) (“Section[] . . . 9(a)(2) require[s] that the proscribed
activities be engaged in with the requisite manipulative intent.”).
194
SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“It is
well settled that the manipulative activities expressly prohibited by § 9(a)(2) of the
Exchange Act with respect to a listed security are also violations of § 17(a) of the
Securities Act and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act when the same activities are conducted
with respect to an over-the-counter security.”). For background on over-the-counter
securities, see supra note 93.
195
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(3)-(4), 15 § U.S.C. 78i(a)(3)-(4)
(2006).
196
An Overview of Market Manipulation, supra note 185, at 104; see also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3) (2006).
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buyers and sellers of listed securities from making “false or
misleading” statements regarding any material fact related to
a security to encourage a purchase or sale of that security,
when the buyer or seller “had reasonable ground to believe”
such statement to be “false or misleading.”197
Section 10(b), the main anti-fraud provision of the
Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, are
commonly used enforcement tools.198 Section 10(b) prohibits any
person, by any means, from the “use . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or
deceptive device.”199 Further, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to
use “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” to make
material omissions or misrepresentations, or to engage in a
fraudulent act “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”200 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not require that a
security transaction in question be effected on a national
exchange, but they do require proof of scienter.201 Negligence
has not been held sufficient to establish scienter under Rule
10b-5, but courts have held that proof of recklessness is
adequate to establish a cause of action.202
In addition to the general securities laws that the SEC
can utilize to regulate short selling, the SEC has also made
permanent Rule 204T, which was initially adopted as a
temporary measure in October 2008.203 Rule 204 now imposes a
borrowing delivery requirement to try to reduce “potentially
abusive ‘naked’ short selling.”204 This rule requires market
participants who fail to deliver securities at settlements to
close out the position (by borrowing or purchasing securities)

197

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(4), § 15 U.S.C. 78i(a)(4) (2006).
Rule 10b-5 is used so commonly because it is also the rule by which the
SEC enforces violations of insider trading. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20
(2002); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 847-50 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
199
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
200
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
201
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980). (“[S]cienter is an element of a
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the
nature of the relief sought.”).
202
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)
(“[R]eckless conduct may be defined as . . . involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,
and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.” (quoting Franke
v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976))).
203
See July 2009 Final Rule Release — Rule 204, supra note 29, at 38,266.
204
Id.
198
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by the start of the trading day following the settlement date.205
If the failure to deliver is not timely closed out, then the
participant
may not accept a short sale order in the equity security from
another person, or effect a short sale in the equity security
for its own account, to the extent that the broker or dealer
submits its short sales to that participant for clearance and
settlement, without first borrowing the security, or entering
into a bona fide arrangement to borrow the security, until
the participant closes out the fail to deliver position by
purchasing securities of like kind and quantity and that
purchase has cleared and settled at a registered clearing
agency.206

This rule is particularly designed to address potentially
abusive naked short selling, which can also affect investor
confidence and create “unwarranted reputational damage.”207
The SEC clearly has a variety of enforcement provisions
available to address fraud or price manipulation through short
selling, but these rules all require targeted enforcement, while
a price test rule theoretically provides a general backstop for
abusive practices without requiring the SEC to prove
intentional conduct or targeted manipulative action toward a
specific security.
V.

THE IMPORTANCE OF A PRICE TEST RULE IN TODAY’S
MARKETS

At the time the uptick rule was repealed in 2007, the
SEC felt that short selling regulation could be scaled back
because of the “high levels of transparency and regulatory
surveillance” in modern markets.208 The Commissioners felt
that the “abusive or manipulative” short selling the uptick rule
was designed to curb was less likely to occur in what the
agency felt to be a highly-regulated environment.209 However,
during the eighteen months following the removal of the uptick
rule, a series of events occurred, indicating that modern U.S.
markets were neither transparent nor well-regulated. The
federal government was required to bail out the United States
205

Id. at 38,292.
Id. at 38,292 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 242.204(b)).
207
Id. at 38,267-68.
208
2006 Proposed Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, supra
note 46, at 75,069.
209
Id.
206
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banking system due to toxic securities that threatened
liquidity; one major investment bank was sold at a fire-sale
price to avoid collapse, while another investment bank holding
company filed for Chapter 11; and the federal government was
forced to take an equity stake in the world’s largest insurance
company as a result of the company’s liabilities for credit
default swaps.210 The proverbial icing on the cake was the
discovery of a massive Ponzi-style fraud scheme costing
investors untold billions of dollars and perpetrated by a wellknown financier.211 While these incidents were unrelated to
short selling per se, and despite the many securities
regulations in place, modern markets appeared to be far less
transparent than posited when deciding to repeal the uptick
rule.
A.

Why Regulation in the Absence of a Price Test Rule Is
Insufficient

The fact that the SEC relied on its assumption of
transparent and well-regulated markets when it repealed the
uptick rule is troublesome. The SEC performed the Pilot and
reviewed several academic studies based on the Pilot before
repealing the uptick rule, all of which indicated that repeal of
the rule would not affect investors and the market.212 However,
after the markets proved to be inadequately regulated in 2008,
the SEC was tasked with reevaluating the uptick rule or
210
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coming up with another type of price test regulation to police
manipulative or fraudulent short selling and to preserve
investor confidence in a volatile market.
1. Importance of Investor Protection
After various corporations, hedge funds, and individual
401(k)s were wiped out in 2008, there was a call for the SEC to
get back to basics by focusing on investor protection.213
Reinstating a price test rule for short selling is one way for the
SEC to enhance investor protection. A major underlying goal of
all federal securities laws is to protect investors by preventing
price manipulation in securities markets.214 In its Proposed
Rule Release discussing the results of the Pilot, the SEC noted
that while “there is concern regarding the possibility of
manipulation using short sales,” the Pilot report did not note
any increases in this practice during the Pilot period.215
However, the Pilot report claims that the analysis it performed
was not designed to directly examine whether instances of
market manipulation through short selling occurred during the
Pilot.216 The OEA also noted that there was a possibility that
“traders with manipulative intentions” may have been more
reluctant to act during the Pilot because of the additional layer
of analysis of the trades due to the Pilot.
In spite of this possibility, one of the major reasons the
SEC felt comfortable removing the uptick rule was the
availability of the “general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation

213
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provisions”217 under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
that allow the agency to enforce fraud or price manipulation
effected through short selling.218 While the SEC can utilize
these statutes and rules to prevent manipulation and fraud in
the absence of a price test rule for short selling, these
regulations have several elements that must be established in
order for the SEC to prove that fraud or manipulation related
to short selling actually occurred.219 Proving fraud or
manipulation can be particularly problematic when delineating
whether or not information is a rumor. Trading and investment
decisions on Wall Street are based partially on research and
partially on instinct and opinions. At times, opinions may also
be nothing more than thinly-veiled rumors. The difficulty in
regulating the spread of rumors is especially obvious today,
when the sheer number of communication methods available
allows rumors to spread like wildfire. Regulating the flow of
information in the market is a mammoth task. Thus, a
permanent backstop to prevent manipulative short selling
would supplement the other securities regulations and give
investors, companies, and markets as a whole consistent
protection.
2. Whispers on the Street—the Rumor Problem
The difficulty of regulating rumors in the markets has
been acknowledged by the SEC. Testifying before the Senate
Banking Committee in July 2008, then-SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox admitted that the SEC did not historically
bring enforcement action against those spreading false rumors
about a stock because of the complexities involved in
determining who originated a false rumor and whether that
originator knew that the information he or she spread was
false.220 During this testimony, Mr. Cox also pointed to the
Commission’s April 2008 lawsuit against a trader as a prime
example of the SEC’s new attempts to enforce the spread of
false rumors.221 In April 2008, the SEC filed a suit against Paul
217
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S. Berliner, a trader, for allegedly spreading a false rumor
about a pending acquisition transaction and charged him with
securities fraud and market manipulation.222 In the case, the
SEC used records of electronic communications, specifically
instant messages, to obtain evidence of the fraud and
manipulations.223 The complaint in this matter alleges that the
trader spread rumors about the pending acquisition of Alliance
Data Systems Corp. (“ADS”) by the Blackstone Group.224 ADS
had agreed to sell its shares to Blackstone for $81.75 per
share.225 The SEC alleged that the trader sent instant messages
to thirty-one investment professionals claiming Blackstone
amended its per-share offer and would now offer only $70.00
per share for ADS’s stock.226 The media eventually picked up on
this rumor and further disseminated the alleged
misinformation.227 To illustrate the incredible swiftness with
which a rumor can spread through the modern financial world,
the stock price of ADS dropped seventeen percent in the thirty
minutes after the trader sent the first instant message.228 Later
the same day, the NYSE put temporary curbs on trading in
ADS stock, and ADS was forced to issue a press release
denying the rumor.229 Concurrently with sending instant
messages, the trader also began to short sell 10,000 shares of
ADS stock, for a profit of $25,509.230
This case was eventually settled,231 but is notable for
several reasons. First, the availability of electronic evidence in
this case made the SEC’s task of proving who originated the
rumor, whether or not the rumor was material information,
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and whether or not there was scienter232 far easier to prove than
if the information in question was spread with an offhand
comment made during a phone call or over a business lunch.
This type of concrete evidence certainly will not be available in
every case of short selling fraud or manipulation, which further
hampers SEC enforcement attempts. Second, the trader in this
case only made a profit of $25,509.233 While not negligible, this
amount is far from remarkable. However, while making this
nominal illicit profit of just $25,000, the trader caused the total
market capitalization of ADS to decline by nearly $1.2 billion in
just thirty minutes.234
Reliable information is paramount to market
confidence. The decline in the market capitalization of ADS
stock related to the Berliner case illustrates how quickly
markets can react and the devastating effect certain
information can have on the price of a security.235 A price test
rule to regulate short selling may help mitigate potential
consequences of the spread of false information or merely
unconfirmed information. Although short sellers provide a
positive service by bringing securities prices close to
equilibrium, harmful rumors, true or not, can wreak havoc and
cause extreme volatility. ADS’s stock price recovered by the
end of the trading day in question as a result of the company
taking quick action to quash the rumor, but the fact remains
that the information that drove down the stock price spread all
over Wall Street in a matter of minutes.236
When rumors persist over a longer period of time and
are not blatantly fraudulent on their face or easily rebuttable
232
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by a company (like the rumor in the Berliner case), those
rumors could potentially have a more devastating effect. One
method of self-help against abusive short selling is for a
company to repurchase its own stock, creating a short
squeeze,237 and showing that the company has access to the
capital markets.238 In fact, at least one commentator has blamed
the SEC for preventing companies from protecting themselves
from manipulative short sellers in this manner because of
uncertainty about whether the companies themselves will be
charged with illicit market manipulation.239 In cases of rumors
spread over a protracted period, a price test on short selling
could slow down the race to short a company’s stock, perhaps
allowing a company a bit more time to deal with their financial
issues in a more orderly fashion, ensuring compliance with all
other SEC regulations and ultimately protecting investors.
In the thick of the 2008 credit crisis, politicians and
Wall Street executives speculated that protracted rumors were
what killed Bear Stearns.240 On July 15, 2008, the SEC issued a
warning that it would begin investigating these rumors to
ensure that there was no fraud or collusion occurring to drive
down Bear Stearns’s stock price.241 Similar concerns regarding
rumors were voiced in regard to Lehman Brothers in the
months before the bank collapsed.242 Since Wall Street “deals in
rumors,”243 regulators have no easy task in proving that short
sellers knowingly spread false information in order to profit.
The SEC has maintained throughout the credit crisis that it
was investigating accusations of fraud and price manipulation
through short selling, but because some enforcement
237
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investigations can take years, it will be some time before the
findings of these investigations come to light.244
B.

The Uptick Rule as a Backstop

Some critics of reinstating the short sale price test rule
have pointed to the SEC’s recent implementation of Rule 204,
regulating naked short sales, as another method to combat
manipulation through short selling, rendering a price test rule
unnecessary.245 While this rule will certainly reduce the number
of “fails to deliver” and thus reduce the chances of
manipulation through short selling, Rule 204 does not provide
an overall backstop like a price test rule and thus would limit
investor protection.246
The uptick rule was also designed to prevent short
selling from hastening a decreasing market so that even down
markets would remain orderly.247 However, during the twelve
month span of the Pilot, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index
increased nearly 12.8%,248 while the Dow Jones Industrial
Average was up 10.9%.249 The Pilot study occurred when the
market was increasing in an “orderly” fashion, but provided no
data that the SEC could use to make an informed conclusion
about the effect of the repeal of the uptick rule in volatile,
declining markets, similar to those of the third and fourth
quarters of 2008.250 The sharp increase in short selling that
occurred at the height of the credit crisis in 2008 was exactly
the scenario the NYSE warned of in its 2006 comment letter,
even though it ultimately supported repeal of the rule.251 The
244
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author of an independent empirical study using Pilot test data
warned that the Pilot results only supported the SEC’s decision
to repeal the uptick rule “conditionally, . . . the condition being
the absence of extreme market conditions.”252
It would be simplistic to blame the increase in short
selling and market volatility following the repeal of the uptick
rule on the removal of the rule alone; many factors contributed
to the upheaval, creating a “perfect storm” of sorts.253 Some
have said that they “doubt whether the continued existence of
the short sale rule is justified, other than perhaps to provide
investors with a semblance of confidence in the markets.”254
However, the absence of the uptick rule or any other price test
restriction or circuit breaker on short selling during a period of
high market volatility and declining stock prices was seen by
some as a factor in exacerbating this credit crisis.255 Even if the
uptick rule is viewed as a mere prophylactic measure, allowing
investors to retain some “semblance of confidence”256 in a falling
market, this underlying confidence can be helpful in calming
volatile markets and stabilizing cascading stock prices.
The volatility and uncertainty in the market is what led
the SEC to issue its September 2008 short sale ban. The
temporary ban on short sales of financial stocks was thrown in
place to prevent the collapse of more financial institutions and
further liquidity issues. Despite the lip service paid to short
sellers by the SEC about the positive benefits of short sales,
such as preventing bubbles, properly valuing stock, and
detecting corporate fraud, short sellers were among the first
blamed during the financial crisis.257 One major complaint after
the SEC announced this ban was whether financial stocks
could be properly valued. For example, on September 15, 2008,
the stock price of Washington Mutual closed at $2.00.258 When
the short sell ban took effect on September 19, the stock price
of the company, which was included on the banned list, closed
at $4.25.259 On September 25, the share close price was $1.69,260
252
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and that evening, the federal government seized the bank and
sold its assets to JPMorgan Chase. From the date the short sell
ban took effect until the day the bank failed, its stock price
never dipped below $2.26261 per share, 13% above its value on
September 15, the day that Lehman declared Chapter 11.262 On
September 16, Washington Mutual issued a statement saying
that it “shouldn’t be judged by its stock price,” and that the
bank would not “go the way of Lehman Brothers” even though
there were already rumors circulating that JPMorgan Chase
was considering a merger.263
In this case, the shorts were right about Washington
Mutual, and it is conceivable that the short sale ban artificially
prolonged the company’s life, but in light of the crisis
surrounding the markets, this was not necessarily a negative
result. Any breathing room provided by the short sale ban may
have allowed the relatively orderly demise of Washington
Mutual. In a market regulated by a short sale price test rule,
the hope is that an extreme full-out ban on short sales would
not be necessary to achieve this result. Ideally, a short sale
price test rule would provide a backstop during troubled times,
without impinging on beneficial short selling in an advancing
market.
VI.

CONCLUSION

After a period of market deregulation beginning in the
mid-1990s, the financial crisis of 2008 devastated the American
economy and resulted in an increase in support for more
regulation of financial markets.264 The credit crisis of 2008 was
certainly not caused by short sellers; bear raids and stock price
manipulation were not what put the global economy on the
precipice of collapse and the existence of the uptick rule during
this period certainly would not have been a panacea to heal all
market woes. Investors continued to lose confidence once the
260
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global securities markets started cascading downward. In any
case, the uptick rule or other price test backstop could have
certainly helped instill some confidence in the stability of the
markets. The fact that the uptick rule remained intact and
unchanged since the advent of modern securities regulation
until 2007 is remarkable, particularly considering that it was
challenged and debated in so many instances.265 Perhaps a price
test rule for short selling is merely a placebo to make investors
feel better during tough times, but that does not mean the rule
cannot be effective; it is difficult to argue that confidence in the
securities markets is unimportant.
The SEC’s dire decision to place an emergency ban on
the short sale of securities of nearly 1000 companies in
September 2008 points to the fact that either short selling was
causing problems in a declining, nervous market environment
or that there was a perception among market participants that
this was the case. The decision to ban short selling of certain
stocks is the sort of panicky and rash decision-making in a
declining market that the uptick rule was designed to
prevent.266 Depending on regulators to piece together a lastminute ban in emergency situations in lieu of a permanent
price test is an unwise decision. The SEC has powers to pass
emergency orders when it sees fit, but waiting until a crisis
occurs before taking regulatory action is not a wise practice,
particularly if the action is too little or too late. Further,
defining an emergency is not always simple.
Finally, relying solely on fraud or anti-manipulation
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts to combat
abusive short selling will be a losing proposition for the SEC,
even with the addition of a rule to prevent naked short selling.
The agency is already strapped for resources,267 but more salient
is the fact that stock markets deal regularly with rumors and
opinions. It is nearly impossible to stop whispers on the Street.
The SEC has gone so far as touting its actions concerning the
Berliner case on its website as a “landmark” action that shows
the Commission was “[a]gressively [c]ombatting” market
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manipulation during the credit crisis.268 If this one case, which
ended in settlement, without adjudication, is a “landmark,” it
seems that using enforcement actions as the only way to
prevent market manipulation through short selling will likely
prove to be very difficult and ultimately, ineffective.
After considering several iterations of a short sale price
test rule, the SEC settled on Rule 201, an alternative version of
the original uptick rule to help protect investors and restore
confidence. The implementation of Rule 201 should help
prevent short sale manipulation, but some feel the rule does
not go far enough.269 Moreover, the Rule is likely to be
challenged by those who believe that regulation of short selling
is market-restricting and comes at too high of an economic cost.
It will thus remain to be seen if the new rule both proves
effective in combating abusive short selling practices and
achieves the same longevity as the original uptick rule.
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